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Abstract— The security of the two party Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol is currently based on the discrete logarithm
problem (DLP). However, it can also be built upon the elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). Most proposed
secure group communication schemes employ the DLP-based
Diffie-Hellman protocol. This paper proposes the ECDLP-based
Diffie-Hellman protocols for secure group communication and
evaluates their performance on wireless ad hoc networks. The
proposed schemes are compared at the same security level with
DLP-based group protocols under different channel conditions.
Our experiments and analysis show that the Tree-based Group
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (TGECDH) protocol is the best
in overall performance for secure group communication among
the four schemes discussed in the paper. Low communication
overhead, relatively low computation load and short packets are
the main reasons for the good performance of the TGECDH
protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure group communication (SGC) refers to a scenario in
which a group of participants can send and receive messages
to/from group members in a way that outsiders are unable to
glean any information even when they are able to intercept the
messages. The vast majority of SGC protocols use the DLP-
based Diffie-Hellman as the basic key agreement protocol [1].
The DLP-based Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol
depends on the discrete logarithm problem for its security.
The key length for secure DLP-based Diffie-Hellman has
increased over recent years, which has also placed a heav-
ier processing load on applications using DLP-based Diffie-
Hellman. However, the processing load is especially critical for
ad hoc networks, which have a relatively limited bandwidth,
slower CPU speed, limited battery power and high bit-error
rate wireless links.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a public key cryp-
tosystem based on elliptic curves [2], [3]. The attraction of
ECC is that it appears to offer equal security for a far smaller
key size, thereby reducing processing overhead. However,
the methods for computing general elliptic curve discrete
logarithms are much less efficient than those for factoring or
computing conventional discrete logarithms and it indicates
that more computation time is required for ECC. Thus, the
overall performance of ECDLP-based applications needs to
be evaluated.
The recent work on performance evaluation of group Diffie-
Hellman protocols can be found in [4] and [5]. In [4], the
authors evaluated five notable group key agreement proto-
cols: Centralized Group Key Distribution (CKD), Burmester
Desmedt (BD), Steer et al. (STR), Group Diffie-Hellman
(GDH) and Tree based Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) con-
cluding that TGDH exhibits the best average performance
in high-delay Wide Area Network (WAN). The study in [5]
evaluated three Diffie-Hellman based shared key agreement
protocols: Group Diffie-Hellman (GDH), Tree-based and Hy-
percubic Diffie-Hellman demonstrating that GDH is good in
ad hoc networks containing less than 100 nodes and TGDH is
attractive for larger networks. These papers provide an elegant
evaluation of the performance of group Diffie-Hellman proto-
cols. However, few studies have been conducted in literature
on the performance of ECDLP-based group Diffie-Hellman
protocols.
In this paper, we propose and evaluate the performance
of ECDLP-based group Diffie-Hellman protocols for secure
group communication under different channel conditions. The
rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the background material necessary to understand the ECDLP-
based protocols. Section 3 presents the proposed ECDLP-
based group schemes. Section 4 analyzes the communication
overhead of each protocol and Section 5 describes the exper-
iments and results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
The two party Diffie-Hellman algorithm was presented by
Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman in 1976 [6]. The
Diffie-Hellman algorithm depends on the difficulty of comput-
ing discrete logarithms. It assumes that all participants know
a prime number p and a primitive root g of p (g < p).
The Group Diffie-Hellman (GDH) key distribution protocols
were first presented in [7]. There are three different versions
and we consider GDH.2 in this paper which involves fewer
number of rounds and messages than GDH.1 and GDH.3. The
GDH protocol consists of two stages: upflow and downflow.
The upflow stage collects contributions from all group mem-
bers. The downflow stage broadcasts the intermediate values
to all group members for calculating the shared group key. The
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authors in [8] introduced a tree based group Diffie-Hellman
protocol which uses a binary tree to minimize the total number
of two party exchanges when computing a group key.
A. Elliptic Curve Cryptography
An Elliptic Curve is usually defined over two finite fields:
the prime finite field Fp containing p elements and the
characteristic 2 finite field containing 2m elements. This paper
focuses on the prime finite field.
Let Fp be a prime finite field so that p is an odd prime
number, and let a, b ∈ Fp satisfy 4a3 + 27b2 = 0(mod p),
then an elliptic curve E(Fp) over Fp defined by the parameters
a, b ∈ Fp consists of the set of solutions or points P = (x, y)
for x, y ∈ Fp to the equation:
y2 = x3 + ax+ b(mod p) (1)
The equation y2 = x3 + ax+ b(mod p) is called the defining
equation of E(Fp). For a given point P = (xP , yP ), xP is
called the x-coordinate of P, and yP is called the y-coordinate
of P.
Cryptographic schemes based on ECC rely on scalar multi-
plication of elliptic curve points. Given an integer k and a point
P ∈ E(Fp), scalar multiplication is the process of adding P to
itself k times. The result of this scalar multiplication is denoted
k×P or kP . Scalar multiplication of elliptic curve points can
be computed efficiently using the addition rule together with
the double-and-add algorithm or one of its variants.
Consider the equation Q = kP , where Q,P ∈ Ep(a, b) and
k < p. It is relatively easy to calculate Q given k and P, but it
is relatively hard to determine k given Q and P. This is called
the discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves.
Elliptic Curve domain parameters over Fp are a sextuple,
T = (p, a, b,G, n, h)
consisting of an integer p specifying the finite field Fp, two
elements a, b ∈ Fp specifying an elliptic curve E(Fp) defined
by equation 1, a base point G = (xG, yG) on E(Fp), a prime n
which is the order of G, and an integer h which is the cofactor
h = #E(Fp)/n.
SEC2 [9] lists some defined elliptic curve domain para-
meters over Fp, which include 112-bit, 128-bit, 160-bit, 192-
bit, 224-bit, 256-bit, 384-bit and 521-bit elliptic curve domain
parameters. Our simulation is based on these parameters.
B. Two Party Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Protocol
Similar to DLP-based Diffie-Hellman key exchange agree-
ment, a key exchange between users A and B using Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) can be accomplished as fol-
lows:
1. A selects an integer nA less than p, this is A’s private
key. A then generates a public key PA = nA ×G; the public
key is a point in Ep(a, b).
2. B similarly selects a private key nB and computes a
public key PB = nB ×G.
3. A generates the secret key K = nA × PB . B generates
the secret key K = nB × PA.
The two calculations in step 3 produce the same result
because nA × PB = nA × (nB × G) = nB × (nA × G) =
nB × PA.
The secret key K is a point in the elliptic curve. If this
secret key is to be used as a session key, a single integer must
be derived. There are two categories of derivation: reversible
and irreversible. If the session key is also required to be
decoded as a point in elliptic curve, it is reversible. Otherwise,
it is irreversible. The reversible derivation will result in a
session key which doubles the length of the private key. In
the irreversible derivation, we can simply use the x-coordinate
or simple hash function of the x-coordinate as the session key
and thus the session key may have a different length with the
private key.
III. PROPOSED ECDLP-BASED SCHEMES
In this section, we propose two ECDLP-based schemes for
secure group communication.
A. Group Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Protocol
The Group Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (GECDH) proto-
col is an extension of GDH based on ECDLP. GECDH can
also be divided into two stages: upflow and downflow. The
upflow stage collects contributions from all group members.
The downflow stage broadcasts the intermediate values to all
group members for calculating the shared group key.
To describe this in more detail, let (M1,M2, ...,Mn) be a
group of users, the i-th round of upflow stage is as follows:
1. Mi, where 0 < i ≤ n, receives a sequence of (i − 1)
intermediate key values {N1...Ni−1Nk G|k ∈ [1, i − 1]} and one
cardinal value Ki−1 = N1...Ni−1G.
2. Mi generates its own contribution Ni.
3. Mi computes the new cardinal value Ki = NiKi−1.
4. The old cardinal value becomes one of the intermediate
values.
5. Multiply each old intermediate value with Ni thus
producing a set of new intermediate values.
6. If i < n, Mi sends Ki and the new intermediate values
to Mi+1.
In the upflow stage, the intermediate key values and the
cardinal value are all points in the elliptic curve and thus
they have double the length of the private key. The last
cardinal value of the highest-indexed group member Mn is
the secret key. In the last downflow round, Mn broadcasts
n− 1 intermediate values to the entire group. Each receiving
Mi identifies its intermediate value and multiples it with Ni
thus computing the secret key. The shared group session key
can be derived from the secret key. In our simulation, we use
the x-coordinate of the secret key as the shared group key.
B. Tree-based Group Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Protocol
The proposed protocol, Tree-based group Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (TGECDH), is a variant of TGDH based on
ECDLP. In TGECDH, a binary tree is used to organize group
members. The nodes are denoted as < l, v >, where 0 ≤
v ≤ 2l − 1 since each level l hosts at most 2l nodes. Each
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TABLE I
PROTOCOL COMPARISON (∗SEE DETAILS IN SECTION IV)
Rounds Total messages Combined message size in bits∗
GDH / GECDH Join n n ku
2
n2 + ( 3ku
2
+ r)n− 3ku
GDH / GECDH Leave n-1 n-1 ku
2
(n− 1)2 + ( 3ku
2
+ r)(n− 1)− 3ku
TGDH / TGECDH Join 2 3 2((n+ 1)h− 2h + 1)ku + (n2 − 1)c+ 3(n− 1)r
TGDH / TGECDH Leave 1 1 hku + r
node < l, v > is associated with the key K<l,v> and the
blinded key BK<l,v> = F(K<l,v>) where the function F()
is scalar multiplication of elliptic curve points in prime field.
Assuming a leaf node < l, v > hosts the member Mi, the node
< l, v > has M ′is session random key K<l,v>. Furthermore,
the member Mi at node < l, v > knows every key in the
key-path from < l, v > to < 0, 0 >. Every key K<l,v> is
computed recursively as follows:
K<l,v> = K<l+1,2v>BK<l+1,2v+1> mod p
= K<l+1,2v+1>BK<l+1,2v> mod p
= K<l+1,2v>K<l+1,2v+1>G mod p
= F(K<l+1,2v>K<l+1,2v+1>)
It is not necessary for the blind key BK<l,v> of each node
to be reversible. Thus, we simply use the x-coordinate of
K<l,v> as the blind key. The group session key can be derived
from K<0,0>. Each time when there is member join/leave,
the sponsor node calculates the group session key first and
then broadcasts the new blind keys to the entire group and
finally the remaining group members can generate the group
session key. Next, we analyze the communication time for
each protocol.
IV. COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS
The group key distribution schemes discussed above are
summarized and compared in Table I.
According to Table I, we can calculate the total message
size in bits for each protocol. Assume we have n (n ≥ 2)
participants and let ki, ku indicate the private key and the
blind key length and r be the overhead of each message.
We use f(Join, n) to denote the total message length when
n participants establish a group key and use f(Leave, 1) to
denote the total message length when the remaining n − 1
participants rebuild the group key after an existing member
leaves.
Then, in GDH or GECDH, the total message length for n
participants to generate the shared key can be calculated as
follows:
f(Join, n) = (
(n+ 3)n
2
− 3)ku + nr
=
ku
2
n2 + (
3ku
2
+ r)n− 3ku
When a member leaves the group, the remaining n-1 par-
ticipants need to rebuild the group key as n-1 parties build the
group key. Thus,
f(Leave, 1) = f(Join, n− 1) (2)
=
ku
2
(n− 1)2 + (3ku
2
+ r)(n− 1)− 3ku
In tree based group Diffie-Hellman protocol, join and leave
have different processing loads. When a new participant joins
a group of size i, three messages are required:
• The new participant broadcasts its blind key
• The sponsor node broadcasts the key tree and the blind
keys of the nodes which are the siblings of the nodes from
the joining member to the root.
• The sponsor node broadcasts the new blind keys to rest
of participants
Assuming we need c bits to represent a key tree node when
a sponsor node broadcasts the key tree, then, the message size
for a new participant to join a group of size i is equal to:
m(i) = (1 + h+ h− 1)ku + (2i− 1)c+ 3r
= 2hku + (2i− 1)c+ 3r
where h is the height of the binary tree and thereby h =
log2 i.
Therefore, the total message length to build a group of n
participants from initial state (including 1 group member) to
final state when all participants can generate the group key
can be calculated as:
f(Join, n) =
n∑
i=2
m(i) = 2snku + (n2 − 1)c+ 3(n− 1)r
where sn = (n+ 1)h− 2h + 1 and h = log2 n.
When a member leaves the group in tree based group
protocols, the sponsor needs to generate a new session key,
recalculate the agreed keys and blinds key along the key path
and broadcast the new blind keys. Thus, the message size for
one member leave is equal to
f(Leave, 1) = hku + r (3)
Let B indicate the bandwidth of the ad hoc network, d be the
maximum distance between two participants, s be the number
of messages to build a group key for n parties and p be the
probability of frames in errors. The communication time can
be calculated as:
t =
f
B
1
1− p +
sd
3× 108
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TABLE II
COMPARABLE KEY SIZES
ECDLP-based scheme DLP-based scheme
(size of n in bits) (modular size in bits)
112 512
160 1024
224 2048
256 3072
384 7680
512 15360
Compared with the transmission time, the propagation delay
sd
3×108 is very small. Thus, we can approximately estimate the
communication time as:
t ≈ f
B
1
1− p (4)
Table II shows the comparable key sizes of the same security
level for an ECDLP-based group scheme and DLP-based
scheme [10]. It shows that ECDLP-based schemes can use
a much smaller key size than DLP-based group schemes. In
this paper, we evaluate ECDLP-based group Diffie-Hellman
schemes at the same security level as the DLP-based Diffie-
Hellman schemes. We use the pair 〈k,m〉 to represent the
security level, where k is the private key size of ECDLP-based
scheme and m is the modular size of DLP-based scheme.
TABLE III
KEY SIZE PARAMETERS
〈112 bits, 512 bits〉 〈160 bits, 1024 bits〉
ki bits ku bits ki bits ku bits
GDH 512 512 1024 1024
GECDH 112 232 160 328
TGDH 512 512 1024 1024
TGECDH 112 112 160 160
Equation 4 is plotted in Figures 1 and 2 for each protocol
to show the communication time for member join operations
at the level of 〈112 bits, 512 bits〉 and 〈160 bits, 1024 bits〉.
The bandwidth is set to 11Mbps and the message overhead
is set to r = 192 bits which is the length of a TCP header
and each key tree node needs c = 24 bits for storage when
broadcasting. The frames error rate is set to p = 8.70%. The
key size parameters used in the calculations are shown in Table
III.
The figures show that ECDLP-based group schemes have
lower communication time than DLP-based group schemes
for member join operations. For example, the communication
time of GDH is 2.2 times that of GECDH and TGDH
is 1.7 times that of TGECDH on average at the level of
〈112 bits, 512 bits〉. Moreover, the advantages increases as the
security level increases. At the level of 〈160 bits, 1024 bits〉,
the communication load of GDH is 3.1 times that of GECDH
and TGDH is 2.4 times that of TGECDH on average.
For member leave operations, the tree-based group Diffie-
Hellman schemes are far better than group Diffie-Hellman
schemes as shown in equations 2 and 3.
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Fig. 1. Communication time: member join, level 〈112 bits, 512 bits〉. The
communication time of GDH is 2.2 times that of GECDH and TGDH is 1.7
times that of TGECDH on average for member join operations.
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
 0.45
 0.5
 0  20  40  60  80  100
Ti
m
e 
(se
co
nd
s)
Group size
GDH
GECDH
TGDH
TGECDH
Fig. 2. Communication time: member join, level 〈160 bits, 1024 bits〉. The
communication time of GDH is 3.1 times that of GECDH and TGDH is 2.4
times that of TGECDH on average for member join operations.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSION
The experiments were conducted on a Linux box running
on a 2.4 GHz Celeron(R) CPU, with 256 MB of memory.
Crypo++ Library 5.2.1 [11] was used for the implementation.
For each experiment, we ran the protocol ten times and
calculated the average. The overall group key generation time
includes communication time but does not include individual
key generation time which is assumed to be completed in the
initial stage. Furthermore, we assume that all the remaining
group members can calculate the group key in parallel when
Mn broadcasts n − 1 intermediate values to the entire group
in the downflow stage of GDH/GECDH or when the sponsor
node broadcasts the new blind keys to the entire group in
TGDH/TGECDH.
In this paper, we use a two state Markov model to character-
ize wireless channels. Markov models have been found to be
an appropriate model to characterize signal to noise variations
in slow fading channels [12], [13]. When used in simulations,
the model is usually constructed with two states, each state
representing either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ channel conditions. All
frames received during a ‘good’ state are assumed to be error
free and all frames received during a ‘bad’ state are assumed to
be in error. Let the rate of transition from the good to the bad
state be p and the rate of transition from the bad to the good
state be q, this model is characterized by computing mean
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durations for each state (i.e. 1/p and 1/q) and then using the
results as the means for exponential distributed state durations.
Table IV shows the mean durations of states as well as the
obtained frame error rates from experiments. Two scenarios
are considered in the experiments: low bit-error rate channels
and high bit-error rate channels.
TABLE IV
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE TWO-STATE MODEL
Bit
error
rate
(BER)
Transmission
rate [Mbps]-
frame size
[bytes]
Mean good
state duration
[s]
Mean
bad state
duration [s]
% of
frames
in error
Low 11-1000 0.0173 0.0015 8.70%
High 11-1000 0.0027 0.0037 58.30%
Figures 3 and 4 show the communication time of the four
compared schemes under different channel conditions when
the group size is 100. The figures show that TGECDH can
tolerate the frame errors in wireless channels.
Figures 5 and 6 show the communication time for member
join operations in the experiments as well as the data in
Figures 1 and 2 at the level of 〈112 bits, 512 bits〉 and
〈160 bits, 1024 bits〉. The experiment results for GDH and
GECDH protocols match with the communication analysis
well but there is a slight difference for TGDH and TGECDH.
This is because TGDH and TGECDH employ short packets
and cause less packet loss in the simulation.
Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10 show the overall group key gen-
eration time for member join and leave at the level of
〈112 bits, 512 bits〉 and 〈160 bits, 1024 bits〉. At the level
of 〈112 bits, 512 bits〉, when the group size is less than
62, GDH requires the least key generation time for mem-
ber join operations. When the group size is more than 62,
TGECDH requires the least key generation time. At the level
of 〈160 bits, 1024 bits〉, GDH requires the least key generation
time for member join operations when group size is less than
25 and TGECDH requires the least key generation time when
group size is greater than 25. Figures 8 and 10 indicate that the
tree based group schemes are far better than GDH or GECDH
for member leave operations.
In Figure 9, when the group size is greater than 70, there
are slight fluctuations in the curves. This may be related to
the implementation details in the Crypo++ library and is under
further investigation.
As for the DLP-based group key agreement protocols, the
agreed group key (denoted as GK) size is at least 512 bits in
order to have acceptable security level. If GK is used as the
secret key to encrypt messages, it is an overkill. Thus, we can
assume that from GK, a secret key SK (for example, 128 bits)
is derived and the SK is used to encrypt messages.
Similarly, for ECDLP-based group key agreement protocols,
we can use GK to derive a SK (128 bits) and use SK to encrypt
the messages. In this way, the problem of doubling cipher text
length is avoided. In addition, if the GK is used on plain text
directly, the plain text needs to be translated to points on the
elliptic curve (i.e., encoding), which is also not an easy task.
if a SK derived from GK is used, this translation is avoided.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose and evaluate ECDLP-based Diffie-
Hellman protocols for secure group communication in wireless
ad hoc networks. The theoretical analysis and experiments
show that TGECDH is the best protocol in terms of over-
all performance for secure group communication in ad hoc
networks among the four schemes we discuss in this paper.
Although for small group sizes, GDH performs better than
TGECDH for member join operations, it takes much more
time for GDH to process member leaves than TGECDH while
TGECDH performs very well for both member join and leave
operations. Moreover, as the key size increases for a higher
security level, TGECDH gains more advantages than other
schemes.
The good performance of TGECDH over wireless ad hoc
networks can be summarized as follows:
• It uses smaller keys.
• It uses less computation time than the DLP-based scheme
for the same security level.
• Smaller packets are used to handle high bit error rate
wireless links.
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Fig. 3. Communication times under different channel conditions, member
join, level 〈112 bits, 512 bits〉: channel conditions have little effect on
TGECDH due to the small size of packets employed.
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Fig. 4. Communication times under different channel conditions, member
join, level 〈160 bits, 1024 bits〉: channel conditions have little affection on
TGECDH due to the small size of packets employed.
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stands for analysis and e stands for experiments.)
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Fig. 6. Communication time from analysis and experiments: member join,
level 〈160 bits, 1024 bits〉, channel conditions: low, 8.7% frames in error.
(a stands for analysis and e stands for experiments.)
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Fig. 7. Group key generation time: member join, level 〈112 bits, 512 bits〉.
GDH costs the least key generation time when group size is less than 62
but after that TGECDH costs the least key generation time for member join
operations.
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Fig. 8. Group key generation time: member leave, level 〈112 bits, 512 bits〉.
Tree-based group Diffie-Hellman schemes are far better than group Diffie-
Hellman schemes for member leave operations.
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Fig. 9. Group key generation time: member join, level 〈160 bits, 1024 bits〉.
GDH costs the least key generation time when group size is less than 25
but after that TGECDH costs the least key generation time for member join
operations.
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Fig. 10. Group key generation time: member leave, level
〈160 bits, 1024 bits〉. Tree-based group Diffie-Hellman schemes are
far better than group Diffie-Hellman schemes for member leave operations.
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